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Abstract 
This paper compares the influence of national institutional environments on the 
internationalisation of SME exporters from two countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
which followed divergent paths in the transition process. It contributes in several ways, 
notably by extending scholarly debate on divergent paths of transition to the IB 
literature, and enriching the institution-based view of IB with perspectives from the new 
institutional economics and comparative institutionalism and offering fresh evidence of 
how formal and informal institutions and the enforcement mechanism interact to create 
specific incentives and barriers for internationalising SMEs. The study, one of the first to 
examine SME exporters from the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, cautions 
against the tendency to attribute countries in the transitional periphery with 
homogenous institutional environments. Analysis of case study evidence suggests 
appreciable differences in the institutional environments facing SME exporters in the 
comparator countries. More specifically, SME exporters in Tajikistan seem to experience 
tougher institutional constraints relative to their Kyrgyzstan counterparts, and this 
divergence in institutional environments appears to affect the internationalisation 
prospects and competitiveness of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan SME exporters adversely 
and favourably respectively. The above findings are richly illustrated in the paper, which 
also discusses implications for theory, managerial and policy decision making and future 
research.  
 
Keywords: transition economies; Tajikistan; Kyrgyzstan; institutional divergence; 
formal institutions; informal institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades, research in international business (IB) has extended its empirical and conceptual reach beyond its traditional Ǯcore Triadǯ roots, yet certain parts of the world are still largely Ǯoff the radarǯ. (ere, we join efforts to extend the geographic scope of the )B discipline into the hitherto neglected Ǯtransitional peripheryǯ 
of post-Soviet Central Asia. Transition economies are characterised by distinctive and 
dynamic institutional environments, which can fundamentally influence business 
strategy (Peng et al., 2008) and are argued to present an important testing ground for IB 
theory (Meyer and Peng, 2005). Further, recent contributions from other social science 
disciplines have drawn attention to widening institutional divergence among the group 
of transition economies (e.g. Havrylyshyn, 2006; Lane and Myant, 2007; Myant and 
Drahokoupil, 2010). Building on these contributions, our paper aims to: (1) explore and 
illustrate how home country institutional environments influence the 
internationalisation prospects and competitiveness of indigenous SMEs from transition 
economies; and (2) examine if and how this institutional influence manifests itself 
differently in countries that have experienced divergent transition paths. We pursue these aims via a comparative, Ǯmatched-pair' case study research design that focuses on 
SME exporters in the cotton and textile industries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan*.  In adopting this approach, we are responding to Jackson and Deegǯs ȋʹͲͲͺȌ plea for a more 
comparative approach to the analysis of institutions and a greater understanding of the 
implications of institutional diversity for IB performance. 
 
                                                          
* We use ǮTajikistanǯ and ǮKyrgyzstanǯ throughout as shorthand for the Republic of Tajikistan and 
the Kyrgyz Republic, two of the five Central Asian countries that were part of the Soviet Union 
until its dissolution in 1991. We chose to focus on the cotton and textile industry because it is a 
key sector for privately-owned, export-oriented SMEs in both countries (IFC, 2009; 2010) and because our comparative, Ǯmatched-pair' case study design required us to focus on SMEs 
operating in the same industry context in both countries (see further discussion in methodology). 
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Our paper makes a number of empirical and conceptual contributions to the literature. 
Firstly, we add to the small number of existing studies on exporting and outward 
internationalisation by SMEs from transition economies (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Glas et 
al., 1999; Kent et al., 2006; Shirokova and McDougall-Covin, 2012; Thai and Turkina, 
2014). Although the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the former 
Soviet Union and China have now received significant attention from business and 
management scholars, many studies in the IB field have focused on inward 
internationalisation to these countries, typically from the point-of-view of Western firms 
(e.g. Bevan et al., 2004; Gelbuda et al. 2008; Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Estrin, 2001; Meyer 
and Peng, 2005). Also, studies of entrepreneurship and SME development in transition 
countries have typically adopted a purely domestic focus (e.g. Aidis, 2005; Estrin et al., 
2008; Manev and Manolova, 2010; Smallbone and Welter, 2012). Our study adds a new 
empirical context to the modest literature on outward internationalisation from 
transition economies by focusing on two countries not previously investigated by IB 
scholars. 
 
Secondly, we add to the small number of existing studies that take an explicit 
institutional perspective on exporting and SME internationalisation issues. There is now 
an extensive literature examining the influence of both internal, firm-specific factors and 
external, environmental factors on export propensity and performance (Aaby and Slater, 
1989; Chetty and Hamilton, 1993; Kaleka and Katsikeas, 1995; Leonidou, 2004; Sousa et 
al., 2008; Wheeler, Ibeh and Dimitratos, 2008; Zou and Stan, 1998). However, relatively 
few studies have so far adopted an institutional lens (LiPuma, Newbert and Doh, 2011; 
Lu, Xu and Liu, 2009; Shirokova and Tsukanova, 2013), which is surprising given the 
growing popularity of institutional approaches in the IB field (e.g. Mudambi and 
Navarra, 2002; Peng et al., 2008; Wood and Demirbag, 2012). Indeed, some authors 
have recently argued that this lack of attention to institutional environments in 
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exporting research has significantly curtailed our understanding of the phenomenon 
(Gao et al., 2010). Our paper also complements the above-mentioned quantitative, 
institution-based studies by adopting a more in-depth, qualitative, case study approach. 
 
Thirdly, and distinctively, we seek to advance research on SME exporting by bringing insights from the embryonic Ǯdivergent paths of transitionǯ literature ȋe.g. Blackmon, 
2007; Havrylyshyn, 2006; Lane, 2014), which is stimulated by the works of varieties of 
capitalism theorists, into the mainstream of IB research. We believe ours is among the 
first studies to make this conceptual link and we suggest that this particular strand of 
the comparative institutionalism literature, which has hitherto been dominated by 
political economists and economic sociologists, can bring new insights to the analysis of 
SME internationalisation from transition economiesȘ. While IB research acknowledges 
contrasting models of transition among larger emerging economies, notably rapidly 
transitioning Russia versus more gradual China (Buck et al. 2000; Hitt et al. 2004), no 
corresponding attention has been paid to smaller peripheral post-Soviet economies. 
This suggests that countries on the transitional periphery may have been viewed by 
much of IB research community as a homogenous category with respect to their 
institutional environments.  Thus, a particular contribution of our paper is to draw IB scholarsǯ attention to the divergent paths of transition experienced in parts of the 
transitional periphery and to explore and illustrate the implications of this institutional 
divergence on IB activity. Empirically, our study shows that two superficially similar and 
geographically contiguous countries have in fact evolved notably different institutional 
environments as a consequence of their distinctive transition paths over the last two 
decades, and that this divergence has had markedly different consequences for the 
nascent, privately-owned SME export sector in the two countries. Our original fieldwork 
                                                          
Ώ Here we acknowledge that Buck et al.'s (2000) comparative study of China and Russia includes the 
focal concept of "divergent reform paths". However, that study did not tap into the comparative 
capitalism stream, which was far less developed at that time, or set out to explore the influence of 
formal and informal institutions on SME exporters. 
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evidence illustrates various ways in which SME exporters in these two countries 
experience their home country institutional environments and uncovers the 
consequences of this key environmental influence for their internationalisation 
prospects and competitiveness.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: following a critical review of pertinent 
theoretical perspectives and literature strands, our studyǯs main methodological 
decisions, including choice of research context and comparative case approach, are 
presented, elaborated, and justified. The research findings are next presented. We 
conclude by discussing and summarizing implications for theory, managerial and policy 
practice, and outlining areas for further research.  
 
2. Relevant literature 
 
2.1 The New Institutional Economics 
 
This paper derives theoretical inspiration from the recently-articulated institution-
based view of international business strategy (Meyer et al. 2009; Peng et al., 2008) and 
from institutional perspectives on entrepreneurship and small firm development in 
transition economies (e.g. Aidis, et al. 2008; Smallbone and Welter, 2012). Both of these 
literature streams draw heavily upon Douglass Northǯs ȋͳͻͻͲ, ͳͻͻͳȌ work on New 
Institutional Economics (NIE), including his delineation of formal and informal 
institutions, and we follow this lead in our paper. Institutions, according to North (1990, p͵Ȍ, are ǲthe rules of the game in a societyǳ. They are forms of constraints created by 
humans to shape, structure, and guide individual and organisational interactions and 
reduce uncertainties in everyday exchanges (North, 1991). Institutions can be formal 
and informal. While formal institutions include official laws, regulations and contracts, 
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informal institutions relate to informal arrangements, unwritten rules and norms of 
behaviour (North, 1990). To understand how institutional environments function and 
influence economic performance, North (1991) also draws attention to the Ǯenforcement mechanismǯ, which relates to the effectiveness of enforcement of formal institutions. 
 
The key premise of this institutional approach is that institutions matter for economic 
performance (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). They set the context and the boundaries for 
doing business (North, 1990). As a result, institutional environments of countries can 
create conditions that either facilitate or hinder economic behaviour of firms (Meyer, 
2001). The notion of transaction costs is central to the institutional approach advocated 
by North (1990; 1991). Well-functioning institutions reduce the costs of transacting for 
firms, while weak institutions increase such costs. If transaction costs remain low, they 
facilitate trade and as a result allow firms (and countries) to expand and capture more 
gains (Peng and Heath, 1996). The application of this institutional approach therefore 
helps to understand how the lack of well-developed and appropriately enforced 
institutions of a market economy may lead to increased uncertainty, ambiguous 
informal barriers to market entry, and high transaction costs for firms (Gelbuda et al. 
2008; Meyer and Peng, 2005; North, 1990). 
 
2.2 The Institution-based View in International Business Research 
 
In recent years, institutions have become a major focus of IB and strategic management 
research (Dunning, 2004; Mudambi and Navarra, 2002; Peng et al., 2009; Wood and 
Demirbag, 2012Ȍ. Thus, Peng et al. ȋʹͲͲͺȌ have proposed that an Ǯinstitution-based viewǯ 
be incorporated as the third leg of a Ǯstrategy tripodǯ alongside the more established 
industry-based and resource-based views of (international) strategy. Of particular 
interest to our paper is the suggestion that the strategic choices made by firms, 
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including their export behavior, are at least in part a reflection of the formal and 
informal constraints that managers face within a particular national institutional 
environment (Peng et al., 2009).  
 
However, despite the growing scholarly interest in institutions and institutional 
approaches within this field, we observe that existing institution-based IB studies have, 
until recently, focused mainly on inward internationalisation to transition (and 
emerging) economies – addressing topics such as FDI location decisions, entry mode 
choice and challenges faced by Western firms in operating in the transitional 
environments (Bevan et al., 2004; Meyer and Estrin, 2001; Meyer et al., 2009). Research 
on the outward internationalisation of transition economy firms is in its infancy (Thai 
and Turkina, 2014). However, a handful of existing studies have supported the 
proposition that certain dimensions of the domestic institutional environment – 
including tax regulations and tax administration, the quality of the legal system and 
incidence of corruption - do indeed affect the export behaviour and degree of 
internationalisation of firms from transition economies (Gao et al. 2010; LiPuma et al., 
2011; Lu et al., 2009; Shirokova and Tsukanova, 2013; Volchek et al., 2013). These few 
existing studies have a number of limitations, which our study begins to address. First, 
they have either analysed patterns across a large basket of countries (LiPuma et al., 
2011; Shirokova and McDougall-Covin, 2012) or focused on a Chinese (Gao et al. 2010; 
Lu et al., 2009) or Russian empirical context (Shirokova and Tsukanova, 2013; Volchek 
et al., 2013). Thus, there is a clear need to broaden the evidence base to different and 
diverse transition contexts. Second, they have mainly adopted a quantitative modeling 
approach (exceptions are Shirokova and Tsukanova, 2013, and Volchek et al., 2013); there is a case for more intensive, qualitative studies that give Ǯvoiceǯ to entrepreneurs 
and SME owner-managers. Third, they have been mainly concerned with formal 
institutions; closer attention to the operation and effects of informal institutions is 
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required given their noted significance in transition contexts. Fourth, we believe ours is 
the first study to adopt a country-comparative approach of the type exhorted by Jackson 
and Deeg (2008).  
 
2.3 Institutional Perspectives on Entrepreneurship and SME Development in 
Transition Economies 
 
Another body of research providing both theoretical and empirical inspiration for this 
paper, as noted earlier, is the burgeoning literature on entrepreneurship and SME 
development in transition economies (e.g. Aidis et al., 2008; Estrin et al., 2008; Manev 
and Manolova, 2010; Welter and Smallbone, 2003). This work also draws heavily on Northǯs ȋͳͻͻͲȌ institutional framework, although it is somewhat less concerned with 
transaction costs analysis. These studies have shown how various aspects of the formal 
and informal institutional environment– such as high tax rates, frequently amended or 
ambiguous tax rules, inadequate and unpredictable legislation, deficiencies in the 
implementation of business regulations, high levels of bureaucracy, and corrupt 
behavior on the part of government officials – obstruct, constrain and structure 
entrepreneurship and SME development in transition countries such as Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, Bulgaria and Lithuania (Aidis, 2005; Manolova and Yan, 2002; 
Smallbone and Welter, 2001; 2012). This literature has inspired and influenced our 
study in a number of respects, including persuading us of the importance of adopting an 
institution-based view in studying SMEs in transition economies and informing our 
selection of specific themes and dimensions to explore in our field research. Our study 
adds to this prior work by introducing a new empirical context. More importantly, we 
extend its scope by looking at SME internationalisation issues in challenging transition 
environments; most prior work in this area has adopted a purely domestic focus. 
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2.4 Comparative Capitalism, Varieties of Post-Socialism and Divergent Paths of 
Transition 
  
In addition to the NIE and recent business/management applications of institution-
based thinking, our paper also draws upon, and seeks to integrate insights from, a different body of work, namely the Ǯcomparative capitalismǯ ȋCCȌ literature. The Ǯvarieties of capitalismǯ ȋ‡OCȌ debate, originated by political economists ȋAmable, ʹͲͲ͵; 
Hall and Soskice, 2001), is perhaps the most dominant approach to CC utilised in 
business and management literature today. This approach is instrumental not only in 
understanding differences in institutional structures across countries with capitalist 
economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001), but also the internal diversity within national 
contexts (Lane and Wood, 2009). A key feature of this literature is the notion of institutional complementarity. (all and Soskice ȋʹͲͲͳ, pͳ͹Ȍ state that ǲtwo institutions 
can be complementary if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from ȋor efficiency ofȌ the otherǳ. Lane and Wood ȋʹͲͲͻȌ further highlight that 
complementarity concerns not only formal structures, but also how these are enacted.  
The presence or absence of institutional complementarities highlights diversity in 
institutional frameworks between the different forms of market economies (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). Notably, this work has delineated distinct and different national models 
of capitalisms among developed economies – e.g. (all and Soskiceǯs ȋʹͲͲͳȌ division of 
liberal versus coordinated market capitalism. Thus, the CC literature usefully draws the attention of )B researchers to the complex and diverse ǲtopography of institutional landscapesǳ ȋJackson and Deeg, ʹͲͲͺ, p541) and suggests the need to incorporate a 
more sophisticated and contextually-rich characterization of national institutional 
environments into IB studies (Michailova, 2011; Redding, 2005). 
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However, when it comes to considering the institutional environments of transition 
economies, the dominant CC literature is largely silent; there has been no empirical 
coverage of such countries. Also, critics have questioned the relevance and applicability 
of the established CC frameworks to transition economies (Myant and Drahokoupil, 
2012). These authors observe that the CC literature tends to assume that institutional 
configurations are permanent or subject to only gradual change, whereas transition 
economies are, by definition, subject to institutional flux and uncertainty (ibid). Crucially, in the case of the former Soviet †nion and especially the Ǯtransitional peripheryǯ, it is observed that the transition process has not followed the once-
anticipated linear progression towards Western models of capitalism; in fact, it remains 
unclear what type of capitalism these countries are moving towards (Havrylyshyn, 
2006; Myant and Drahokoupil, 2012). Thus, as an off-shoot of, or alternative to, the 
mainstream CC literature discussed above, we can identify a distinct and emergent 
strand of work, dominated to date by political scientists and economic sociologists, that 
seeks to identify, classify and comprehend varieties of capitalism in post-
communist/transition countries (Feldmann, 2006; Lane and Myant, 2007). A key 
argument of this literature is that the unprecedented process of transforming planned 
economies into well-functioning market economies has taken a distinct trajectory in 
each country, and one that is characterised by path dependence. Consequently, these 
divergent paths of transition (Havrylyshyn, 2006; Blackmon, 2007) have resulted in a, 
perhaps unanticipated, institutional diversity among the group of transition countries. 
Thus, borrowing from the CC approach, including its notion of institutional complementarity, authors in the Ǯvarieties of post-socialismǯ strand have identified a 
number of different emerging models of capitalism in transition economies, including Laneǯs ȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍ three-fold typology comprising Ǯstate-led capitalismǯ ȋSlovenia, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Croatia, Romania and BulgariaȌ, Ǯhybrid ȋstate/uncoordinatedȌ capitalismǯ ȋRussia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
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Georgia and MoldovaȌ, and the Ǯtransition laggardsǯ characterised by statist economies 
(Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus). Similarly, Havrylyshyn (2006) identifies four 
types of transition currently prevailing in post-communist states - based on a wide range 
of political, economic and social indicators, such as degrees of democratization, 
privatization, openness of competition and centralisation of power – namely: Ǯliberal societiesǯ ȋincluding all of the E† New Member States of the 2004 accession); Ǯintermediate regimesǯ ȋcomprising Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria and RomaniaȌ; Ǯlagging reformersǯ ȋBelarus, Turkmenistan and †zbekistanȌ; and Ǯcaptured statesǯ ȋRussia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan, 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan). The last three countries are said to have undergone 
significant evolution and are moving in the direction of intermediate regimes.  
 
Though many of these countries continue to be collectively labeled as transition 
economies, and may be deemed to have similar political economies, the aforementioned 
literature usefully highlights to IB scholars the significant divergence that has taken 
place in the nature and direction of transition among the group. Further, we note that 
this diversity of transitions shapes the process of institutional development, and 
influences the specific type of market economic system that is being constructed, in 
particular countries (Myant and Drahokoupil, 2012). Whilst the IB research community 
has paid considerable attention to understanding the effects of institutional 
environments on IB activity in transition economies, it has not yet accommodated 
insights from the political science and sociological literatures in its analysis or explored 
the implications of the varieties of transition for IB activity. This observation is 
particularly noteworthy, given that comparative institutionalism was recently identified 
as one of the three main institutional approaches to IB (Hotho and Pedersen, 2012), 
alongside NIE (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000) and new organisational institutionalism 
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(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). Hence, we seek to break new ground in our 
study by infusing insights from this divergent transition paths literature into our study.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
Our study adopts a qualitative case study approach to collect data from exporting SMEs 
in the cotton and textile industry of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The following 
paragraphs explain and justify the key methodological decisions made. 
 
3.1 Case Study Design and Study Context 
 
Our study adopts a qualitative case study approach, a well-established research strategy 
in the IB field (Ghauri, 2004), in view of the need to address Ǯhowǯ and ǯwhyǯ questions 
(Yin, 2003) and understand a contemporary phenomenon (SME internationalisation) 
within its real-life context (the national institutional environments). Contextual factors, 
which are often neglected in IB research (Michailova, 2011), were of central importance 
to our study and the case study approach allowed us to gain an in-depth understanding 
of complex institutional environments and expose various specific details that might 
have been overlooked using other research strategies (Sarantakos, 1998). 
 
As indicated in the earlier literature discussion, any investigation of institutional 
environments in post-socialist countries – especially in the transitional periphery - 
requires due consideration of potentially complex and ambiguous informal constraints, 
as well as traditional formal rules (Meyer and Peng, 2005; North, 1997). The relevant 
stream of empirical research on informal institutions in transition economy contexts 
identifies a wide range of informal rules and practices that prevail across these 
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countries. They include relationship-based business (Bevan, et al., 2004); personal 
networks and connections (Aidis et al., 2008; Smallbone and Welter, 2001); familial 
networks (Estrin and Prevezer, 2010); traditions of Ǯblatǯ, bribery and gift-giving 
(Ledeneva, 1998); clan ties and clan networks (Collins, 2006); and informal patronage 
(Collins, 2009; Estrin and Prevezer, 2010). Collins (2006; 2009) argues that the prevalence of informal connections and relationships, more commonly known as Ǯblatǯ 
and denoting informal exchange of favours often among clan members and networks of 
friends (Ledeneva, 1998), is particularly widespread in Central Asian countries, 
including Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. From a theoretical standpoint, these types of 
informal institutions are often highly important in governing economic activities in 
countries undergoing a comprehensive structural and institutional transformation of 
the formal sphere (Peng and Heath, 1996; Peng et. al. 2009). This suggests that informal 
institutions, which attract comparatively less attention in the business/management 
literature, are likely to have a profound effect on firm behaviour and performance 
(North, 1987; 1990). 
 
We chose a comparative, qualitative, 'matched-pair' case study design, comprising two 
country institutional contexts with multiple embedded units of analysis (Yin, 2003),  
namely exporting SMEs (employing under 500 employees) in the cotton and textile 
industry of both countries (as depicted in Figure 1). The choice of cotton and textile 
industry reflects its status as a major sector for privately-owned, export-oriented SMEs 
in both countries (IFC, 2009; 2010). This comparative case design provided a supportive 
platform for cross-country analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). The choice of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan as our two country (institutional) contexts reflects both our interest in 
extending IB research into the 'transitional periphery' and the need to examine 
countries that have experienced divergent transition paths. A key factor in the Tajik case 
was the civil war that afflicted the country in the earlier years following independence 
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(Heathershaw, 2009); this effectively delayed, and perhaps derailed, the start of the 
transition process. Additionally, Tajikistan has been traditionally included in the category of Ǯslow reformersǯ along with the likes of Belarus, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, and has been characterised by weak democratic institutions and high levels 
of centralisation (EBRD, 2002). Unlike Tajikistan, and its other Central Asian 
neighbours, Kyrgyzstan has followed a more liberal and more democratic path to 
transition (EBRD, 2013). The unprecedented political changes that followed the ǮTulip Revolutionǯ of ʹͲͲͷ ȋTudoroiu, ʹͲͲ͹Ȍ strengthened commitment to further market 
reforms and engendered a more pluralist political culture. Thus, we observe clearly 
divergent paths of transition and apparently contrasting institutional environments in 
the two countries, which justified their selection as comparative cases. Even though 
both countries have been characterised as 'captured states' in some recent varieties of 
transition studies (Havrylyshyn, 2006), the foregoing account shows that they have 
actually experienced divergent transition paths since their independence in 1991. 
Various international organizations, indeed, rate Kyrgyzstan much more favourably 
than its neighbour in terms of business environmentș. 
  
< insert Figure 1 about here > 
 
The need to focus our investigation on the home country institutional dimension also 
influenced our selection of a pair of countries that could be 'matched' on various other potentially significant dimensions. )n Yinǯs ȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍ terms, this amounts to a Ǯtheoretical replication logicǯ, and our country cases were chosen based on a theoretically-derived 
proposition that predicted contrasting results for anticipated reasons (i.e. because of 
institutional divergence under distinct transition paths). Hence, to Ǯhold many factors 
                                                          
ΐ For example, KyrgyzstaŶ’s couŶtry raŶkiŶgs iŶ the World BaŶk’s 2013 overall ͞Ease of Doing 
BusiŶess͟ report was 70th  (up from 90th iŶ ϮϬϬ7) coŵpared to TajikistaŶ’s ϭ4ϭst (down from 133rd in 
2007).  
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constantǯ (Buck et al., 2000, p286) and 'control' for possible industry effects we chose to 
study SMEs operating in the same industry in a pair of countries that were similar on a 
number of other dimensions: predominantly agricultural economies; significant cotton 
and textile sector - historically so for Tajikistan and more recently in Kyrgyzstan; similar 
geographical territories, population size, standards of living and levels of economic 
development. Above all, both were part of the Soviet Union for over 70 years and, 
following its dissolution, embarked on transition from quite similar starting points. The 
countries are similarly disadvantaged in several respects in terms of export potential: 
both are mountainous, landlocked and geographically remote from key international 
markets with poor internal infrastructure and international connectivity. The selective 
timeline of key events presented in Table 1, below, provides further background 
information on both countries, but also illustrates their divergent transition paths; see 
also Figure 2, on ERBDǯs transition indicators, which suggest a delayed, more gradual 
and less complete transition toward industrialized market economy standards in 
Tajikistan than in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
 < insert Table 1 and Figure 2 about here > 
 
3.2 Data Collection Techniques and Sources of Evidence 
 
Taking advantage of the flexibility of the case approach, we used data from multiple 
sources (Yin, 2003). We used secondary data from various reports and statistical series 
(published by international institutions like EBRD and the World Bank), as well as 
national government reports and legal documents (e.g. laws, presidential decrees) – 
particularly to inform our understanding of the institutional environments and chosen 
industry. However, we employed qualitative face-to-face interviews as our primary data 
collection technique (Yeung, 1995), since we sought to develop ǲa genuine 
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understanding of the world views of members of a social settingǳ ȋBryman and Bell, 
2007, p477). Specifically, as our primary embedded units of analysis were indigenous 
SME exporters, we interviewed owners/managers of such firms (16 in Tajikistan and 18 
in Kyrgyzstan) to find out how they perceived and experienced their national formal and 
informal institutional environments and to explore how this impacted on their 
internationalisation prospects and competitiveness (Figure 1). In addition, reflecting Eisenhardt and Graebnerǯs ȋʹͲͲ͹, pʹͺȌ advice on ǲusing numerous and highly knowledgeable informants who view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectivesǳ, 
we conducted a range of interviews with expert informants in each country (14 in 
Tajikistan and 10 in Kyrgyzstan), including industry specialists, legal experts, academics, 
consultants, senior government officials, and representatives of various national and 
international NGOs. Expert interviews, which are commonly used in social research, 
target individuals with a high degree of knowledge or insight in a certain domain, with 
the aim being to capture and reconstruct the expert's understanding of a phenomenon 
(Bogner et al., 2009). Our expert interviews provided an informed, non-firm perspective 
on the institutional environment in both countries, an independent assessment of 
potential institutional constraints on SMEs and their internationalisation activities, and 
a further understanding of the cotton and textile industry. These additional insights 
complemented the assessments provided by SME owners/managers and secondary 
sources, allowing for triangulation of data (Yin, 2003), in order to minimize respondent 
bias and, in turn, increase the validity and reliability of our evidence (Ghauri and 
Gronhaug, 2002). 
 Cognisant of Ghauri and Gronhaugǯs advice on the importance of giving adequate attention to sampling issues prior to field research in order to identify ǲthe most relevant respondentsǳ, we used purposive sampling ȋGhauri and Gronhaug, ʹͲͲʹ, pͳ21) 
to select firms from several geographical regions and different stages of the cotton and 
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textile value chain, plus the aforementioned experts, in each country. Given our interest 
in IB activity, the key, theoretically-informed eligibility criteria for the former group 
were that firms be indigenous, export-oriented, privately-owned SMEs. Suitable firms 
were initially identified through official databases of registered firms held by the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Economy of both countries, with snowball sampling based 
on word-of-mouth and recommendations being used to expand the pool of respondents. 
A summary profile of the SME exporters in our sample is provided in Table 2. Following Eisenhardtǯs ȋͳͻͺͻ, pͶͷͶȌ ǲtheoretical saturationǳ strategy, we identified the 
appropriate number of interviews as the point in data collection where new interviews 
added little or no new knowledge. This point was reached after 30 interviews in 
Tajikistan and 28 in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, 58 in-depth face-to-face interviews were 
conducted in all; these lasted 60 minutes on average. 
 
< insert Table 2 about here > 
 
Interviews were based around a topic guide informed by the literature, with specific 
questions relating to (a) formal institutions, (b) informal institutions, and (c) 
enforcement issues (after North, 1990) (see Appendix 1 for a selection of interview 
questions). Our qualitative approach sought to shed light on the ways in which firms 
experience or perceive specific aspects of their home country institutional environments 
and how these shape their behavior and impact their export performance. Interviews 
with SMEs also included introductory questions in order to obtain background 
information on companies and their key export destinations. Most interviews were 
conducted by one of the authors in the native languages of interviewees, which were 
mainly Russian and Tajik. On three occasions where interviews were conducted in the 
Kyrgyz language, an interpreter was required to translate conversations into Russian. 
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All interviews were digitally recorded and the recordings were later transcribed and 
translated into English by this author, who has proficiency in all three languages.  
 
Conducting interviews in different languages is not uncommon in the field of IB. It is 
argued that conducting interviews in the native languages of interviewees helps establish rapport and can lead to ǲmore authentic answersǳ ȋWelch and Piekkari, ʹͲͲ͸, 
p425). However, a key challenge is that original meanings may be distorted during the 
translation process. Thus, important measures were taken to address translation issues. 
Firstly, nine pilot interviews were conducted to test the interview guide and enhance 
the formulation of research questions in the native languages of interviewees. Thus, 
elements of local terminology were incorporated, as for instance it was suggested to use Russian words of ǲblatǳ ȋrefers to informal exchange of favoursȌ and ǲkryshaǳ ȋtranslates 
as roof or backer) if interviewees had difficulty in understanding the direct translation 
of informal connections and relationships. Secondly, we followed a two-stage process of 
analysing and comparing the transcripts in their original languages as well as in 
translation, as suggested by Welch and Piekkari (2006). To achieve this, interview 
recordings were first transcribed into their original languages and later translated into 
English transcripts with considerable care. This process was undertaken by the author 
who conducted the interviews to ensure consistency in the approach. Thirdly, four 
samples of English interview transcripts from each case study country were back-
translated (Brislin, 1986) into their original languages by two professional interpreters. 
Discrepancies between the original and translated transcripts were examined. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis  
 
The analysis of data was conducted in two stages. First, to enhance the trustworthiness 
of research findings, transcribed interviews were organised and categorised in relevant 
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themes and topics, and coded using NVivo 9, as recommended by Sinkovics, Penz and 
Ghauri (2008). In line with our stated aims, the key sub-themes concerned the nature of 
the formal and informal institutions and the enforcement mechanism, and how and why 
certain aspects of the institutional environments influenced SME exporters; some coding 
nodes were based around themes from prior literature and theory, whereas others 
emerged from the data, following the inductive theory building approach advocated by 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) and Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007). The second stage of 
data analysis involved both within-case and cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
These involved careful examination of key emerging sub-themes in order to understand 
similarities and differences in the institutional environments of the two countries and 
variations in how these impacted exporters in both countries. In keeping with the 
comparative case study design, cross-case analysis was deemed particularly important. 
 
4. Analysis of findings 
 
 
The comparative analysis undertaken in this section is based on data from interviews 
with SME exporters in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, complemented with insights from 
targeted experts from both countries. As discussed earlier, North (1990) defines 
national institutional environments as comprising of three key components: (a) formal 
institutions; (b) the enforcement mechanism; (c) and informal institutions. Thus, to 
address our aims of exploring and illustrating how home country institutional 
environments influence SME exporters and examining if, and how, this influence differs 
between countries that have experienced divergent transition paths, we collected data 
relating to these three components. Here, we present our analysis of pertinent interview 
data in regard to these three main themes in turn:  
(a) perceptions of formal institutions, specifically the taxation system; 
(b) perceptions of enforcement of formal institutions; 
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(c) perceptions of informal institutions, specifically the prevalence and role of informal connections and relationships ȋǮblat'Ȍ. 
Table 3 summarizes the key findings from our comparative analysis of the two 
countries, under each of the three themes. Below we present and analyse a selection of 
the empirical evidence that underpins these headline findings. 
 
< insert Table 3 about here > 
 
4.1 The Perceptions of Formal Institutions (Specifically the Taxation System) in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan  
 
Interview data from SME exporters credit Kyrgyzstan with a more conducive set of tax 
policies than Tajikistan. In particular, Kyrgyz firms in this industry typically incurred 
lower costs of compliance with tax legislation than their Tajik counterparts, with most of 
the latter reporting regular unannounced visits by apparently corrupt tax officials, 
intent on identifying errors and extracting unofficial payments: ǲThe tax inspector comes for an inspection, he sits and drinks tea with us, takes his share, and goes. (e doesnǯt really inspect anything, because we know that if he does, he will most likely find something … and fine us. So we have to give him 
his share for him to leave us alone. (Firm 16, Tajikistan). 
 Kyrgyzstanǯs taxation system was perceived by most of the firms and expert informants to be more predictable and less volatile than Tajikistanǯs, which translates into lower 
transaction costs for firms. The new patent law introduced in Kyrgyzstan in 2006 to 
reduce tax barriers for SME exporters in the cotton and textile industry, which has no 
equivalent in Tajikistan, exempts Kyrgyz SMEs from tax reporting and allows simplified 
tax payments. It was indicated that before the introduction of this law, Ǯindiscretionsǯ 
(i.e. corrupt behaviour) were commonplace, similar to current reports from Tajikistan. 
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However, the introduction of the law reportedly reduced the number of visits by tax 
inspectors, as well as the level and frequency of unofficial payments made to them: 
 ǲBefore it was different; a tax official would come and bluntly ask us to make 
official tax payments, as well as unofficial payments to him and to his superiors. 
But after they have introduced this patent system, it became much simpler and easier for us to work.ǳ ȋFirm ͳʹ, KyrgyzstanȌ 
 ǲFive-ten years ago the taxation system was a mess; informal costs were particularly high… But look around now, there are so many textile exporters like 
us in Bishkek alone, and this is because from a regulatory point of view it is no longer difficult to enter this industry…ǳ ȋFirm ͳ͵, KyrgyzstanȌ 
 
In addition to reducing the level of informal payments made to tax officials, the above 
statements indicate that the patent law is considered by firms as a significant 
improvement in the regulatory environment that reduced tax-related barriers for 
entering the industry and had a positive influence on competition. To put this into 
perspective, while lack of competition and low level of competitiveness of firms in the 
industry, resulting partly from the unconducive nature of tax legislation, was a recurrent finding in Tajikistanǯs context, the opposite was true in the case of Kyrgyzstan. )t is 
important to emphasise that these findings were corroborated and reinforced by similar 
views about the taxation system from expert informants in both countries:  ǲOur taxation system is an intimidation tool. )t is disastrous for firms. )t changes every year … this all adds up to the price of products produced and exported by our firms.ǳ ȋSenior Agribusiness Expert, Ministry of Agriculture; Expert ͳͲ, 
Tajikistan) 
 ǲBefore the tax burden for such firms was significant… they were exposed to 
various inspections, whereas now they are not. The patent system made life considerably easier for exporters…ǳ ȋSenior Advisor on Trade and Customs 
Issues, Ministry of Economic Regulations; Expert 2, Kyrgyzstan). 
 
The presented evidence suggest that removing the powers of officials to conduct regular 
checks contributed significantly to downsizing the formerly excessive levels of bureaucracy. Further changes made to Kyrgyzstanǯs tax legislation, which also included 
reducing the total number of taxes from 16 to 8 and the VAT rate from 20% to 12 %, 
clearly indicate the transition toward a more liberalised taxation policy that fosters 
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competition, encourages internationalisation, and features low level of state 
intervention in market activities of firms. Thus, informants in Kyrgyzstan regarded tax 
legislation as one of the better-reformed and relatively unproblematic formal institutions in the national context. )n contrast, Tajikistanǯs tax legislation appears to be 
one of the most problematic components of the institutional environment, with 
informants characterizing its nature as ǲunsupportiveǳ ȋFirm ͹Ȍ and ǲexcessively bureaucraticǳ ȋFirm ʹȌ and its impact on SME exporters as ǲdetrimentalǳ ȋFirm ͳͳȌ and ǲtotally disastrousǳ ȋFirm ͳͶȌ. Evidence clearly points to a high level of state 
intervention and bureaucracy that result in high transaction costs for firms. This shows that Tajikistanǯs tax legislation is a relatively under-reformed formal institution. 
 
4.2 The Perceptions of Enforcement of Formal Institutions in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
While formal institutions constitute a key component of the national institutional 
environment, their enforcement is similarly critical. Our findings point to different 
enforcement regimes between the two countries, which also appear to result in different 
institutional constraints for SMEs. Interview data strongly suggests a lack of effective 
enforcement of certain formal rules in Tajikistan, which creates obstacles for exporters. 
In contrast, evidence from Kyrgyzstan suggests that institutions are generally more 
effectively enforced there. In particular, export procedures were found to be complex, 
inefficient and unreasonably costly in Tajikistan, with most of the interviewed exporters 
attributing difficulties they encountered not necessarily to laws themselves, but to their 
inappropriate implementation and administration: ǲObtaining export certificates is supposed to be easy… but in reality it is not that easy. And thatǯs because our law enforcement is weak. Laws have been updated 
and improved many times, but things on the ground havenǯt really changed much…ǳ ȋFirm 9, Tajikistan) 
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The above informant states that ineffective law enforcement results in certain 
difficulties in obtaining export-related certificates, which in turn leads to loss of time 
and increased costs of exporting. It is further indicated that despite some formal 
improvements in export regulations, ineffective enforcement of laws means that there is 
little progress made in properly implementing these regulations in practice. In contrast 
to Tajikistan, evidence from Kyrgyzstan did not suggest obtaining export-related 
documentation to be burdensome. Kyrgyz firms not only incur lower export-related 
costs, but also face fewer practical and regulatory barriers to exporting: ǲ…to some retailers we export ourselves, without intermediaries and it is not a 
big deal; as long as we have all the relevant export documents, there is no 
problem with exporting. To the contrary, our export conditions have really improved…ǳ ȋFirm ͳͶ, KyrgyzstanȌ 
 ǲThe process of obtaining export certificates is not difficult at all; it has been simplified and we obtain them without any difficulties…. Before we used to wait up to a week for certificate of origin; now we get it in a dayǳ ȋFirm ͹, KyrgyzstanȌ 
 
 
Our analysis of some key reforms in the area of trade policy and customs administration 
together with the evidence from SME exporters and expert informants suggest that both 
countries adopted broadly similar regulations, yet appear to perform differently in 
relation to the actual implementation of these reforms. The most relevant example is the 
adoption of the so-called ǮSingle Windowǯ reform, which is aimed at facilitating foreign 
trade by simplifying customs procedures and reducing inefficiencies and additional 
costs associated with exporting and importing. The reform was initiated in both 
countries in 2008 and is technically and financially supported by several international 
NGOs (Hornbrook and Kiseleva, 2011). However, while the project is well into its 
implementation phase in Kyrgyzstan, its progression is notably slower in Tajikistan, 
where it is still in formalisation phase. According to an international expert who works 
for one of the international NGOs which is involved in the implementation of this project 
in both countries, it is unlikely that the ǮSingle Windowǯ reform in Tajikistan will be 
implemented at the same pace and with the same intensity as in Kyrgyzstan: 
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ǲThis reform will not only be a significant money saver, but it will also cut 
corruption… Implementing the Single Window in Tajikistan however is more 
difficult because first there is a strong resistance from certain people in the 
government, and second there is a big lack of understanding and intellectual capacity to implement this idea.ǳ ȋ)nternational Consultant on Trade Facilitation 
Issues, International NGO; Expert 4, Kyrgyzstan). 
 
The following statement from an expert informant in Tajikistan, who heads a think-tank 
promoting free-market reforms, similarly confirms perception of many SME exporters 
on the variation between formal rules on paper and their implementation in practice: ǲ…one of the fundamental reasons our reforms produce little impact is because the mechanism of implementing new policies doesnǯt really exist… these policies continue to remain on paper… our administration is not as reformist as it declares itself to be…ǳ ȋChairman, )nternational Non-Profit Think-Tank; Expert 
1, Tajikistan) 
 
This evidence sheds important light on possible reasons for the poor implementation 
and administration of formal institutions in the context of Tajikistan. While the first 
informant points to the apparent existence of opposition from within the government to accelerate the implementation of the ǮSingle Windowǯ reform, the second informant 
claims that the government altogether lacks a strong enforcement mechanism, as a 
result of which new laws and policies on paper produce little tangible progress in 
practice. This implies that while in Kyrgyzstan the institutional environment continues 
to advance, leading to enhanced market conditions for SME exporters, in Tajikistan such 
firms continue to operate and compete in an under-developed and somewhat stagnant 
environment with limited market conditions. The foregoing analysis reinforces the emerging argument that Tajikistanǯs formal institutional framework is considerably less 
liberalised and under-reformed compared to Kyrgyzstan.  
 
4.3 The Perceptions of Informal Institutions (Specifically the Prevalence and Role of 
Informal Connections and Relationships) in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
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Field evidence from the present study also points to markedly different perceptions of 
informal institutions between the interviewed SME exporters from the two study 
countries. Specifically, it emerged that personalised informal connections and 
relationships, commonly known in post-Soviet societies as Ǯblatǯ (Ledeneva, 1998), tend to have more decisive effect on local SMEsǯ export prospects and access to key resources 
in Tajikistan compared to Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Cotton is considered the most important raw material for production and export of 
fibre, yarn, textiles and garments, and the cotton and textile industries in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan contain a growing number of export-oriented producers and suppliers. 
Internationalisation opportunities for these firms depend to a certain extent on securing 
access to key resources required to enter the industry and to export. Our interview 
evidence indicates that informal connections play an important role in securing access 
to raw cotton, circumventing bureaucratic hurdles to exporting, and protecting private 
property from racketeers and illegal raiders in Tajikistan, but less so in Kyrgyzstan:  ǲCompetition is formally free. But informally this sector is controlled by a few 
powerful players, and unless you have connections to these players, it is simply not realistic to enter and become successful.ǳ ȋFirm ͳͶ, TajikistanȌ. 
 ǲOf course, the fact that my relative was at that position [senior government 
official] at the time helped us to start the business, to establish the supply of cotton and get some support… do you think we could survive for more than a decade without connections?....ǳ ȋFirm ͳ͵, TajikistanȌ. 
 ǲ)f we were in Europe, perhaps this factory would have been established several years ago… )t is sometimes the matter of who you know… So, of course these informal connections and relationships are important.ǳ ȋFirm ͳͷ, TajikistanȌ. 
 
Tajik informants claimed that the various branches of the state continue to have an 
overwhelming influence on the production and distribution of cotton. In addition, it 
appears that a limited number of powerful established players, to whom the designation 
of ǲcotton baronsǳ provided by Collins ȋʹͲͲͻ, pʹ͸ͻ) seems to be appropriate, exercise a 
high degree of control on key decisions concerning the market entry, which suggests 
 25 
certain oligarchic tendencies in the industry. Thus, according to the second informant, 
having strong informal ties to these established and influential players is essential for 
securing access to cotton and engaging in export-related activities. The third informant 
sheds further light on the role of informal connections by implying that the lack of such 
connections has possibly delayed the entry of the firm into the industry. In contrast, 
evidence from Kyrgyzstan suggests that informal connections played a similar major 
role in the past, but their importance has apparently diminished in recent years: 
 ǲ…you donǯt need informal connections… All you need is money. You need 
money to acquire equipment, to hire specialists and engineers, and to secure 
supply of raw cotton by providing incentives to cotton producers to cultivate cotton.…ǳ ȋFirm ͺ, KyrgyzstanȌ. 
 ǲ) donǯt think informal connections are important for entering and working in 
the textile sector. I know it from my own experience, because I have strong informal connections, but ) didnǯt need any connections to open my business…ǳ 
(Firm 15, Kyrgyzstan). 
 
Again, our findings were corroborated and reinforced by similar perceptions about 
informal connections from expert informants in both countries. Especially revealing is 
the statement by the Kyrgyz expert, who highlights the presence of oligarchic tendencies 
in the industry in the past, which resembles the current situation in Tajikistan: ǲLocal governments exert a lot of informal pressure on cotton producers, and 
unless you have strong connections who can influence local governments, you wonǯt be able to source the raw material you need... And without the raw 
material, you canǯt export anything. )t is a very simple mechanism!ǳ (Cotton 
Industry Expert, International NGO; Expert 8, Tajikistan). 
 ǲ)nformal connections were very important a few years ago… especially during 
the Bakiev [former president] time when his relatives controlled the sector. But it has changed… What is important now is not your connections, but whether 
you can offer cotton producers the best price. Competition is relatively free now.ǳ ȋSenior Agribusiness Expert, International NGO; Expert 8, Kyrgyzstan) 
 )t appears that the informal institution of Ǯblatǯ is notably more prevalent in Tajikistan, 
while its prevalence appears to be diminishing in Kyrgyzstan. This means that firms 
with strong informal connections in Tajikistan, amongst many advantages, enjoy a 
privileged access to resources and a better protection of their property, while those 
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without such connections are disadvantaged and face tougher market conditions. This 
prevalence of informal arrangements fosters an uneven competitive environment and 
creates imperfections in the market mechanism, which can translate into adverse outcomes for local SMEsǯ export prospects and competitiveness. )nformal institutions in 
Kyrgyzstan, however, seem less constraining. This stark difference appears to stem, at 
least partly, from the superior quality of formal institutions and the mechanism of their 
enforcement, and the more progressive and liberal nature of transition in Kyrgyzstan 
that creates a pro-market regulatory environment, encourages competition and 
discourages state intervention. As suggested by our interview data, this is also 
associated with recent political regime changes in Kyrgyzstan, which have led to greater 
transparency in the industry and the diminishing role of informal connections in 
accessing resources. This underlines how divergence in the political transformation 
translates into contrasting institutional barriers for SME exporters in the two countries. 
 
5. Discussion, Conclusions and Implications 
 
5.1 Formal Institutions and Divergent Transition Paths 
 
Our analysis of formal institutions provide evidence of Kyrgyzstanǯs more advanced reforms in the area of tax legislation, which relative to Tajikistanǯs lack of corresponding 
reforms, indicates a divergence in the development of formal institutions and 
concomitant differing impact on SME exporters from both countries (Furubotn and Richter, ʹͲͲͲȌ. This reflects North and Weingastǯs ȋͳͻͺͻȌ proposition that incentives 
constitute an important institutional mechanism through which governments influence the behaviour and performance of firms. )n Kyrgyzstanǯs case, specific tax incentives 
seem to have not only reduced various inefficient transactions, but also increased 
opportunities for firms to enter the cotton and textile industry and engage in exporting. 
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In contrast, the Tajik evidence illustrates how a relatively weak and under-developed 
tax legislation, characterised by high tax rates, increased informal costs and 
unpredictable regulations, makes Tajik exporters less competitive and potentially less 
attractive in export markets (North, 1987; Peng and Heath, 1996).  
 
The varied impact of formal institutions can be linked to differences in liberalisation policies. The literature on divergent transition paths emphasises that Ǯintermediate statesǯ are characterised by greater liberalisation of formal institutions and the wider economic activity, which appears to fit the case of Kyrgyzstan, whereas Ǯcaptured statesǯ demonstrate stagnancy in the process of liberalisation, often due to ǲself-interest of the political leadershipǳ ȋ(avrylyshyn, ʹͲͲ͸, p͸ʹȌ. )ndeed, the case of Tajikistan appears to 
fit this well. This finding also highlights divergence between the two countries in the 
speed of institutional reform, with Kyrgyzstan demonstrating greater urgency in 
implementing market reforms compared to Tajikistan (as shown in Table 1). Our 
analysis, therefore, finds support for the argument that the extent and pace of the 
transition process matters for SME internationalisation. This evidence corroborates the 
literature on entrepreneurship and SME development in transition economies 
(Smallbone and Welter, 2001), which suggests that institutional environments in 
countries in early stages of transition tend to have a more constraining influence on 
entrepreneurship, whereas those in countries in later stages of transition tend to have a 
more supportive or enabling influence.  
 
5.2 Enforcement of Formal Institutions and Institutional Complementarity 
 
The new institutionalism emphasises that institutions facilitate fruitful economic 
exchanges and reduce transaction costs only when they are effectively implemented 
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(Furubotn and Richter, 2000). The observed divergence in the implementation of 
market reforms highlighted by our findings, not surprisingly, results in contrasting 
levels of institutional constraints for firms (North, 1990) from our focal countries. Contrary to Tajikistanǯs, the institutional environment in Kyrgyzstan exerts a more 
positive influence on SME exporters, by reducing transaction costs, removing certain 
regulatory barriers for cross border trade and providing incentives for indigenous firms to engage in exporting. Thus, our findings support Gao et al.ǯs ȋʹͲͳͲ, p͵ͺ͵Ȍ observation that ǲan improved institutional environment can foster a better overall business environment and facilitate firmsǯ export behaviourǳ, as well as Meyerǯs ȋʹͲͲͳȌ argument 
that well-designed and effectively implemented formal institutions not only reduce 
transaction costs for firms, but also signal an important progress in the process of 
institution building toward a market-based system.  
 
Importantly, our findings on the enforcement of formal institutions resonate with the 
notion of institutional complementarity, which is widely discussed in the comparative 
capitalism literature. Institutions are considered complementary when the efficiency of 
one leads to increased returns of another (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Lane and Wood, 
2009). Taking formal institutions and their enforcement mechanism as two 
complementary institutions, Kyrgyzstan would appear to show a higher degree of 
institutional complementarity in view of its notably stronger enforcement of formal 
institutions. Tajikistan, on the other hand, demonstrates lower degree of institutional 
complementarity given its distinctly weaker enforcement mechanism. This divergence 
in institutional complementarity has differing impact on the internationalisation 
activities of SMEs from the two study countries.  
 
5.3 The Varying Significance of Informal Institutions 
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The IB and entrepreneurship literature on transition economies suggest that informal 
institutions tend to be more influential in countries with weak (i.e. poorly designed and 
ineffectively implemented) formal institutions (Meyer, 2001; Peng et al., 2009; Smallbone and Welter, ʹͲͳʹȌ. The present studyǯs evidence from Tajikistanǯs cotton and 
textile industry reinforces this literature, as informal arrangements play a particularly 
important role in organising economic activities and regulating transactions associated 
with the buying and selling of cotton. The resulting adverse impact on local SMEsǯ export 
prospects and competitiveness resonates with the new institutionalism view that the 
prevalence of informal arrangements restricts competition and creates imperfections in 
the market mechanism (Furubotn and Richter, 2000). National institutional frameworks 
can be effective where they consist of institutions that encourage competition and 
promote productivity-raising activities, but they can be constraining where they comprise institutions ǲthat provide barriers to entry, encourage monopolistic 
restrictions, and impede the low-cost flow of informationǳ ȋNorth, ͳͻͻͲ, p͸ͶȌ. While the 
first part of this statement seems more applicable to Kyrgyzstan, the second part 
appears particularly relevant to Tajikistan. The observed difference in the prevalence of 
informal institutions appears to reflect with the contrasting nature of political transformation in the two countries studied. Ǯ)ntermediate regimesǯ are characterised by a gradual move in the direction of liberal politics, whereas in Ǯcaptured statesǯ the polity is effectively Ǯcapturedǯ and the power remains consolidated in the hands of a narrow 
political elite (Havrylyshyn, 2006). We tentatively suggest that the diminishing 
prevalence and role of informal practices in Kyrgyzstan can be linked to the constant 
political evolution (i.e. regime changes) and the gradual decline in economic and 
political oligarchy in that country. Conversely, the enduring pervasiveness of informal 
relationships and practices in Tajikistan appears to have been perpetuated by continuity 
in the political regime and established economic oligarchic systems. This finding aligns 
with the literature on divergent transition paths, which labels such economies also as 
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Ǯclientelisticǯ, characterized by patronage-based systems of informal relationships 
(Myant and Drahokoupil, 2010). 
 
5.4 Conclusions  
 
This paper has sought to (a) explore and illustrate how home country institutional 
environments influence the internationalisation prospects and competitiveness of 
indigenous SMEs from peripheral transition economies; and (b) examine if, and how, 
this institutional influence manifests itself differently in countries with divergent 
transition paths. Using a comparative, Ǯmatched-pairǯ case study research design, 
focused on SME exporters in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstanǯs cotton and textile industry, we 
found appreciable differences in the effects of national institutional environments on the 
internationalisation prospects and competitiveness of exporting SMEs from the two 
study countries. The institutional environment in Tajikistan - where the transition 
process has been slower, more fraught and less complete - is more adverse and constraining for SME exporters, whereas Kyrgyzstanǯs – where the transition began 
earlier and has made more progress - appears relatively benign and, in some cases, 
enabling for exporters. We attribute the observed differential impact, at least partly, to the two countriesǯ divergent paths of institutional transition. This institutional diversity 
would seem to have resulted in tougher and milder institutional constraints for 
indigenous SME exporters in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively.  
 
5.5 Research Contributions 
 
Our study contributes by extending scholarly debate on divergent paths of transition to 
the IB literature. Although this theme is emphasised in the varieties of transition 
literature, it has hitherto been largely unexplored, particularly empirically, in IB 
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research. Our study evidence, thus, represents an important step in addressing this 
research gap, and its dual country focus responds to Jackson and Deegǯs ȋʹͲͲͺȌ recent 
call for a more comparative approach to the analysis of institutions within the field of IB. 
By integrating perspectives from new institutional economics and comparative 
capitalism, the study offers further understanding of the implications of institutional 
diversity on IB activity. Notably, it cautions against the tendency to attribute countries 
in the transitional periphery with homogenous institutional environments.  
 
For institutional theory, specifically the Comparative Capitalism literature, our research 
makes two important contributions. First, it empirically extends the field to countries in 
the previously neglected transitional periphery. Second, it breaks new ground by 
demonstrating the particular relevance of the Varieties of Transition approach, as an 
alternative to the mainstream Varieties of Capitalism tradition, for analysing differences 
in the institutional environments of transition economies and explicating issues of 
institutional diversity between them. It further enriches the institution-based view of IB 
by offering evidence of how formal and informal institutions and the enforcement 
mechanism interact within national contexts to create specific incentives and barriers 
for internationalising SMEs. 
 
Ours is also amongst the first studies to examine SME exporters from the former Soviet 
Republics of Central Asia. Thus, this research offers valuable insights into rarely 
investigated SME exporters from this region, whilst adding to the scant empirical 
literature on internationalisation of SMEs from transition economies (Filatotchev et al., 
2001; Shirokova and Tsukanova 2013; Thai and Turkina, 2014). Furthermore, our 
qualitative case study methodology complements the quantitative approach adopted in 
recent studies examining the influence of formal and informal institutions on SME 
exporters from transition economies (LiPuma et al., 2011; Lu et al., 2009).  
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5.6 Managerial and Policy Implications 
 
The contrasting outcomes achieved by SME exporters from the two study countries 
suggest a number of pertinent steps for leaders of businesses operating in weaker 
institutional environments such as Tajikistan. First is the need to activate industry or 
private sector-wide networks, where they do not currently exist, and to transform these 
into powerful platforms for engaging with and lobbying governments, international 
development partners and other stakeholders to facilitate improvements in their home countryǯs institutional environments. As recent World Bankǯs ȋʹͲͳ͵Ȍ Doing Business 
Report indicates, more formal institutional constraints such as the taxation and 
regulatory systems, and the enforcement thereof, could feasibly be ameliorated through 
such interventions. Culturally-embedded informal institutional constraints such as the 
prevalence of informal connections and payments are likely to be more intractable, but as the present studyǯs Kyrgyz evidence and relevant theory ȋNorth, ͳͻͻͲȌ suggest, the 
strengthening of formal institutions often reduces the need for informal arrangements 
and vice versa. Second, in addition to collective lobbying and application of legitimate 
pressures, businesses operating in such challenging transition economies should strive 
to develop adaptive strategies and coping mechanisms for navigating through the 
various institutional barriers that might adversely affect their international market 
entry and success prospects.  
 
Foreign businesses operating or aiming to enter such economies, probably for resource, 
strategic asset or efficiency seeking reasons, would do well also to adopt a mixture of 
the transformative and adaptive approaches recommended above. Larger multinational 
players with considerable bargaining power may be able to exert direct influence on 
host governments to mitigate formal institutional constraints, while less influential 
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enterprises may have to do so through the good offices of their home governments or 
international development partners. Foreign firms of whatever size should note that 
informal institutions may pose greater challenges to their businesses than formal 
institutions, and that they are likely to be well served by adaptive strategies, anchored 
on a sound understanding of the cultural underpinnings of prevalent informal 
institutions. Such knowledge, which can be facilitated through varying forms of strategic 
partnerships with local players, may enable the foreign company to develop coping 
mechanisms to neutralize, side-step or compensate for the more deleterious effects of 
informal institutional constraints.  
 
In terms of policy implications, our study clearly indicates that governments seeking to 
encourage and support the emergence and growth of indigenous SME exporters need to 
give very serious consideration to the impact of prevailing domestic institutions on such firms. )n Ǯinstitutionally-challengedǯ transition economies, governments should seek to 
upgrade and refine their formal rules, regulations and laws so as to minimize the 
barriers and constraints facing SME exporters and other businesses. In doing so, these 
governments should avail of the abundant support and expertise available from various 
international development-promoting organisations and learn from prior successes and 
failures elsewhere. Where reforms are adopted, governments will need to show 
demonstrable and sustained commitment to institutional reforms, and to match words 
and commitments with appropriate implementation. Our study has provided clear 
evidence that reforms to formal institutions on paper do not always guarantee 
favourable changes to firmsǯ lived experience of institutional barriers and constraints Ǯon the groundǯ. Therefore, governments should give careful consideration to the 
practicability of any proposed institutional reforms, in terms of implementation and 
enforcement, during the design and planning stage. Our evidence also suggests the possibility of Ǯdesigning outǯ some opportunities for undesirable manifestations of 
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informal behavior – such as rent-seeking and corrupt practices on the part of Ǯinsider firmsǯ and various state officials – with beneficial effects on the lived experiences and 
business success of SME owners and managers. The Kyrgyz ǮPatent Lawǯ and Single 
Window reforms provide two such examples, where the simplification of regulations 
and enforcement procedures seems to have led to a reduction in constraints and a 
notable increase in new firm entry and export activity. 
 
5.7 Limitations and Future Research 
 
Qualitative case study research, such as ours, is often challenged on the issue of 
generalizability (Yin, 2003). We believe this study has produced some potentially 
generalizable theoretical contributions but the context-specific nature of our 
investigation and qualitative approach suggest the need for further research on our 
focal themes in other transition economies, and in other industry sectors, in order to 
confirm, refute, refine or extend the findings. There is also a need for more extensive, 
quantitative studies that examine the impact of various institutional factors on SME 
internationalisation across a wider basket of countries, and using more sophisticated 
measures of the institutional context, so as to complement the qualitative insights 
provided here. One particular issue that requires further examination is the relationship 
between formal and informal institutions, and how this changes over time and under 
different transition paths. Peng et al. (2009) have posited that informal constraints play 
a larger role in situations where formal constraints are unclear or fail, and argued that 
improvements in formal institutions during the transition towards a market economy – 
as in the case of China – may, over time, lead to a reduction in the significance of 
informal ways of doing business. We found some tentative support for this view in our 
Kyrgyz case but we are unsure if institutional reforms will ultimately see ingrained 
informal practices such as blat and bribery wither away in the Central Asian context. 
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Longitudinal case study research may offer the best avenue for exploring this question. 
Finally, the divergent transition paths concept that informed this study presents another 
avenue for future exploration by IB scholars, who may wish to explore the impact of this 
divergence on strategic behaviours of MNEs in different contexts. Country comparative 
studies, such as ours, can provide a suitable approach for these endeavours. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of case study research design 
 
 Source: authorsǯ own work 
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Table 1: Tajikistanǯs and Kyrgyzstanǯs divergent transition paths – selective timeline of 
key events in economic and political spheres 
Year Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan 
1991 Gains independence from USSR. 
Communist leader Rakhmon 
Nabiev becomes President. 
Gains independence from USSR. 
Askar Akaev elected first president 
of independent Kyrgyzstan. 
1992 Civil war breaks out. 
Rakhmon Nabiev resigns, 
replaced by Emomali Rakhmon. 
Becomes first in Central Asia (CA) 
to adopt a comprehensive 
programme of market-oriented 
reforms. 
1993 Worst years of hostilities. 
Government establishes control 
and suppresses opposition. 
New constitutions passed. 
Becomes first CIS country to 
introduce its own currency. 
1994 Emomali Rakhmon elected as 
first President of independent 
Tajikistan. 
Progress made in liberalising 
prices and commercial activity, 
and in privatisation and 
denationalisation.  
1995 War continues. Renewed 
fighting breaks out on Afghan 
border.  
President Akaev re-elected for 
another 5 year term.  
1997 Peace agreement achieved in 
Moscow between Government 
and United Tajik Opposition to 
end civil war.  
Reform programme continues. 
Important progress made in 
establishing private property 
rights. 
1998 Among various legislations, a 
new Tax Code is introduced.  
Becomes first CIS country to gain 
membership of the WTO. 
1999/ 
2000 
President Rakhmon re-elected 
for the second term. 
President Akaev re-elected for the 
second term. 
2002 Country described in EBRD ȋʹͲͲʹȌ as a Ǯslow reformerǯ with 
low levels of political 
competition. 
Country described in EBRD (2002) as an Ǯintermediate reformerǯ with 
partially consolidated democracy. 
2003 Referendum allows President 
Rakhmon to run for further two 
consecutive terms.  
Public discontent toward the 
regime grows, amid claims of 
media control and increasing 
authoritarian rule.  
2005 Revised Tax Code put into act, 
including more than 100 
changes and containing 21 
types of taxes.  
ǮTulip Revolutionǯ overthrows 
Akaev regime, replaced by 
Kurmanbek Bakiev as second 
President.  
2006 President Rakhmon re-elected 
for the third term.  
Anti-government, pro-reform 
protests take place in the capital 
Bishkek.  
2008 ǮSingle Windowǯ reform 
initiated, backed by several 
major NGOs . 
ǮSingle Windowǯ reform initiated. 
Implementation begins same year. 
2009 EBRD (2009) describes the New Tax Code reduces types of 
 42 
Source: authorsǯ summary, based on various secondary sources. 
 
  
implementation of market 
reforms as a potentially 
problematic area. 
taxes from 16 to 8 and the VAT 
rate from 20% to 12%, lowest in 
CA. 
2010 Begins the implementation of ǮSingle Windowǯ reform.  President Bakiev ousted following popular uprising. Roza 
Otunbayeva, becomes third 
(interim) President. 
2011 Revised Tax Code is proposed to 
the parliament for approval.  
Elections held in accord with the 
new constitution; Almazbek 
Atambaev elected as fourth 
President. 
2013 Gains membership of the WTO. 
President Rakhmon re-elected 
for the fourth time, until 2020.  
Described in EBRD (2013) to have progressed Ǯfaster and furtherǯ 
among CA states in adopting 
market reforms. 
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Figure 2: EBRD transition indicators for 5 Central Asian countries (plus Estonia) 
 
 
 
Note: The EBRD assesses progress in transition through a set of transition indicators. 
The measurement scale for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, where 1 represents little 
or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 4+ represents the standards of 
an industrialised market economy. The scores shown are a computed as a simple 
average of six EBRD indicators. The case of Estonia is included as a benchmark example, 
representing the most widely acclaimed and complete transition among former Soviet 
republics. 
Source: authors' calculations based on EBRD transition indicators data 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data (accessed 02/10/14). 
 
  
 44 
 
Table 2: Profiles of Interviewed Tajik and Kyrgyz SME Exporters 
S/N 
  
Founded No. of 
employees 
 
Export markets Interviewee 
position 
 
Tajikistan 
 
Firm 1 2004 32 Russia Owner 
 
Firm 2 2000 30 
 
Russia, Iran Owner 
 
Firm 3 1998 54 Russia Owner 
 
Firm 4 1997 80 Russia, Switzerland Owner 
 
Firm 5 1998 55 Russia, Iran Owner 
 
Firm 6 1970s, 
privatised 1998 
121 Russia, Iran, 
Turkey, China, 
Germany 
General 
Manager 
Firm 7 2002 300 Russia, Switzerland, 
Iran, China 
General 
Manager 
Firm 8 1970s, 
privatised 1995 
200 Russia General 
Manager 
Firm 9 2010 160 Turkey, Iran, 
Ukraine, Russia 
General 
Manager 
Firm 10 1980s, 
privatised 1995 
180 Latvia, Russia, 
Switzerland, Iran 
General 
Manager 
Firm 11 1950s,  
privatised 2001 
27 Russia, Ukraine, 
Iran 
General 
Manager 
Firm 12 1998 20 Latvia, Estonia, 
Italy 
Owner 
Firm 13 1990 15 Switzerland, Italy Owner 
Firm 14 1994 120 Russia, Switzerland General 
Manager 
Firm 15 2010 100 Russia, Italy, Latvia General 
Manager 
Firm 16 2009 140 Russia, Germany General 
Manager 
 
Kyrgyzstan 
 
Firm 1 2008 15 Russia Owner 
Firm 2 2007 24 Russia, Switzerland, 
Kazakhstan 
Owner 
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Firm 3 2007 120 Russia, Kazakhstan  General 
Manager 
Firm 4 1993 25 Russia Owner 
Firm 5 1997 30 Russia, Latvia Owner 
Firm 6 1960s, 
privatised 1996 
240 Romania, Sweden, 
Russia 
General 
Manager 
Firm 7 1970s, 
privatised 1999 
100 Russia, Turkey, 
China 
General 
Manager 
Firm 8 1998 160 Russia General 
Manager 
Firm 9 2004 190 Turkey, China, 
Russia, Sweden 
Iran 
Owner 
Firm 10 2008 60 Switzerland, 
Germany, Russia 
Owner 
Firm 11 2007 25 Turkey, Kazakhstan Owner 
Firm 12 1997 70 Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Belgium 
General 
Manager 
Firm 13 2004 50 Turkey, Germany, 
Russia 
General 
Manager 
Firm 14 2005 40 Russia, Kazakhstan General 
Manager 
Firm 15 1996 50 Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Belgium 
General 
Manager 
Firm 16 2006 30 Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan 
Owner 
Firm 17 2000 110 Russia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Latvia 
General 
Manager 
Firm 18 1996 60 Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan 
General 
Manager 
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Table 3: Comparative analysis of data highlighting divergences in institutions 
Analytical themes Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan 
Theme (a): Perceptions of formal institutions (as discussed in 4.1) 
 
Predictability and 
complexity of tax 
inspection regime 
Tax rules change 
frequently; compliance is 
complex and costly  
Recent changes have 
been positive; rules 
considerably less 
complex than before 
Norms and practices 
of tax inspection 
regime 
Unannounced visits and 
checks by inspectors is 
commonplace; unofficial 
payments made frequently 
Unannounced visits and 
checks are infrequent; 
unofficial payments to 
inspectors are rare 
Overall views about 
the taxation system 
Largely negative Largely positive 
Theme (b): Perceptions of enforcement of formal institutions (as 
discussed in 4.2) 
Overall views about 
the enforcement 
mechanism 
Enforcement of formal 
institutions is generally 
ineffective and sporadic 
Enforcement is generally 
more effective and more 
consistent 
Variation in 
institutional 
complementarity 
Degree of complementarity 
between formal institutions 
and their enforcement 
mechanism is generally low 
Degree of 
complementarity 
between formal 
institutions and their 
enforcement is notably 
higher 
Theme (c): Perceptions of informal institutions (as discussed in 4.3) 
Role of informal 
connections for 
entering the industry 
Important in entering 
cotton and textile sector 
Unimportant in entering 
cotton and textile sector 
Role of informal 
connections in 
facilitating exporting 
Important in reducing 
bureaucratic hurdles 
associated with exporting 
Unimportant in reducing 
bureaucratic hurdles 
associated with 
exporting 
Role of informal 
connections in 
gaining privileged 
access to resources 
Very important in obtaining 
land, state orders, and 
financial resources/loans 
Notably less important in 
obtaining same 
resources 
Role of informal 
connections in 
protecting private 
property rights 
Having krysha (i.e. backer) 
is very important in 
protecting private property 
from racketeers and illegal 
raids 
Having krysha is less 
important in protecting 
private property from 
racketeers and illegal 
raids 
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Appendix 1 
 
Selection of interview questions   
 
 
Formal institutions 
 
- What is your assessment of the business environment in the country? 
- Tell me about the main regulatory impediments faced by your firm. 
- More specifically, how does the taxation system affect your export 
competiveness? Can you elaborate? 
- How many official/unofficial visits do you get annually from tax inspectors? How 
do you handle the pressure and potential disagreements with them? 
- How challenging is the process of obtaining export related documentation? Tell 
me how long it takes to get certificates of origin, conformity, and phytosanitary. 
- Have you experienced any tangible improvements in export procedures over the 
course of recent years? 
- Are you satisfied with the nature and direction of reforms, particularly in the 
areas of taxation and foreign trade? Can you elaborate why? 
 
Enforcement mechanism 
 
- Tell me about the effectiveness of law enforcement in terms of protection of 
private property. Do you feel assured that your property is protected? 
- How do you handle problems related to illegal raids and racketeering? 
- How do you assess the effectiveness of business rules and regulations in 
practice? Do formal rules on paper function effectively in practice? 
- How often do you experience problems, for instance delivery delays or informal 
costs, as a result weak enforcement of specific regulations? 
- Do you observe any informal rules and practices that are enforced on exporting 
SMEs in addition or instead of official rules and regulations? 
 
Informal institutions 
 
- Tell me about the prevalence and role of informal relationships and connections 
in the business context in the country. 
- How important is it to be well-connected, in terms of having krysha and blat, in 
order to enter this industry in particular? 
- How important is it to have strong informal connections in order to obtain 
access to resources? 
- Can you tell me about your personal experiences of informal connections, in 
terms of personal ties with influential officials or big industry players? 
- Why do you think these informal institutions continue to dominate and influence 
economic activity/are becoming less dominant and influential in the economy? 
 
